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Abstract
The aim of  this paper is to explain the apparent paradox between political 
Islam and Islamic political parties in Indonesia. On one hand, the support for 
Islamic political parties is in decline, while, on the other religious intolerance 
and the implementation of  local regulations based on the shari’ah laws have 
increased in many provinces. This paper argues that political Islam and Islamic 
political parties are not synonymous. Moreover, the aim of  achieving an ideal 
society according to an Islamist’s vision and their religious interpretations does 
not only by adopt a top-down strategic model through participation in formal 
politics but also by using bottom-up strategic model by focusing on the societal 
level. By adopting gradualist approaches, hardliner Islamist ideas disseminate 
peacefully in Indonesia today. This study will focus on West-Sumatra as a 
case study, considering West Sumatra is one of  the most widely province issued 
the shari’ah laws in Indonesia. This article will shed light on local and often 
underestimated dynamics.
[Artikel ini menjelaskan paradoks antara Islam politik dan partai politik 
Islam di Indonesia. Jika pada satu sisi, dukungan terhadap partai politik 
Islam menurun, namun pada sisi berbeda tingkat intoleransi dan angka 
peraturan daerah berbasiskan syariah meningkat. Karena itu, artikel ini 
berargumen bahwa Islam politik dan partai politik Islam tidak selalu sejalan. 
Selain itu, cita-cita untuk mewujudkan masyarakat yang Islami tidak melulu 
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harus diwujudkan dari atas-ke-bawah melalui partisipasi politik, namun juga 
dari bawah-ke-atas, yakni menitikberatkan pada level masyarakat. Dengan 
strategi gradual -perlahan-lahan-, gagasan fundamentalis Islam tanpa sadar 
telah‍menginfiltrasi.‍Artikel‍ini‍menjelaskan‍Sumatra‍Barat‍sebagai‍studi‍
kasus persoalan di atas. Pilihan Sumatra Barat berdasarkan pada realitas 
bahwa di propinsi inilah, perda shari’ah paling banyak diberlakukan. 
Artikel ini akan berkontribusi pada diskusi mengenai politik lokal dan 
dinamikanya.]
Keywords: Political Islam, Minangkabau, shari’ah laws
A. Introduction
Since the fall of  the Suharto regime in 1998 and the implementation 
of  democracy through free and fair elections, aspirations among Islamic 
religious elites for having better access to the state power had been 
raised. Consequently, some have chosen to establish Islamic political 
parties to participate in elections. Among the 48 parties eligible to take 
part in the 1999 election, 21 were Islamic parties.1 The Islamic religious 
elites believed that through participation in formal politics, they could 
achieve their vision of  an ideal society, according to their interpretation 
on Islamic teaching, by using a top-down strategic model.
Following the collapse of  the Suharto regime, the emergence of  
political Islam was one of  the crucial political issues among many others, 
such as, pushing for democracy and civilian’s rights, military reform and 
regional autonomy, as discussed by experts.2 They were concerned that 
1 Greg Barton, “the Prospects for Islam”, in G. Lloyd and S. Smith (eds.), 
Indonesia‍Today:‍Challenges‍of ‍History (Singapore: Singapore Institute of  Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2001), p. 246.
2 Dwight King, Half-hearted‍Reform:‍Electoral‍Institutions‍and‍the‍Struggle‍for‍Democracy‍
in Indonesia (Westport, Conn: Praeger 2003); Steele Andrew, “the Decline of  Political 
Islam in Indonesia 2006, Asia Time, March 28, 2006 [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
Southeast_Asia/HC28Ae03.html]; Greg Fealy, Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: 
Decentralisation & Democratisation (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); 
Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia, Present and Future Trajectory”, 
Asian Survey, 44, 5, 2004; William R. Liddle and Saiful Mujani, “Leadership, Party, and 
Religion: Explaining Voting Behaviour in Indonesia,” Comparative Politics Studies, 40, 7, 
2009; Bernhard Platzdasch, “Down but Not Out: Islamic Political Parties did not do 
well, but Islamic Politics going Mainstream,” Inside Indonesia, 97, 2009 [http://www.
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Indonesia’s fledgling democracy would be hijacked by Islamist3 group(s) 
and would become an Islamic state. These concerns are understandable, 
considering that Indonesia is a Muslim majority country and large 
numbers of  Islamic parties had been established post reformasi (reform). 
However, by observing popular support for the Islamic parties over the 
past ten years, many scholars concluded that the majority of  Muslim 
voters did not to regard Islam as critical factor to their electoral decisions.4 
The aforementioned scholars’ argument can be proven empirically 
base on the result of  the elections from 1999 to 2009. Election outcomes 
indicate that popular support for Islamic parties has declined despite 
the fact that majority of  voters, more than 88%, are Muslims. This had 
resulted in definitive pronouncement by scholars arguing that Indonesia’s 
democracy would not be hampered by the growth of  political Islam since 
the popular support for Islamic parties had declined collectively.5 A similar 
argument was also pounded by Liddle and Mujani who argued that the 
declining of  support for religious parties indicates popular disapproval 
of  the enforcement of  shari’ah or other forms of  Islamism in Indonesian 
political life.6 They argued that the decline of  popular support for Islamic 
parties is synonymous of  the decline of  political Islam.
The hypothesis that Islamic party is synonymous with political 
insideindonesia.org/edition-97-jul-sep-2009/down-but-not-out-05071210]. 
3 Term ‘islamist’ is referring to Fuller’s definition on Political Islam or Islamism. 
He argued that “Islamist is one who believes that Islam as body of  faith has something 
important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary 
Muslim World and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion.” See Graham E. 
Fuller, The Future of  Political Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
4 Dwight  King, “Half-hearted reform”; Steele Andrew, “the Decline of  Political 
Islam”; R. Liddle, William and Saiful Mujani, “Leadership, Party, and Religion”; Bernhard 
Platzdasch, Down but Not Out”; Andreas Ufen, “From Aliran to dealignment: Political 
Parties in post-Soeharto Indonesia”, Southeast Asia Research, 16, 1, 2008; Greg Fealy, 
“Indonesia’s Islamic Parties in Decline,” Inside Story, 2009 [http://inside.org.au/
indonesia%E2%80%99s-islamic-parties-in-decline/]; Sunny Tanuwijaya, “Political Islam 
and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critical Assessing the Evidence of  Islam’s Political 
Decline”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 32, 1, 2010; Kikue Hamayotsu, “The End of  
Political Islam? A Comparative Analysis of  Religious Parties in the Muslim Democracy 
Indonesia”, Journal of  Current Southeast Asia Affairs, 30, 3, 2011.
5 Hamayotsu, Kikue “The End of  Political Islam?”, pp. 133-159.
6 R. Liddle, William and Saiful Mujani, “Leadership, Party, and Religion”; pp. 
832-857.
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Islam has to be tested. Is Hamayotsu’s contention that the decline of  the 
Islamic political parties, particularly in the post reform era, signals the 
decline of  political Islam?7 If  that is the rationale, then what explains the 
increased implementation of  shari’ah laws at the regional level, almost 
all over the Indonesian archipelago? Is the support for Islamic parties 
bound to fail because of  their exclusive and puritanical ideology and 
illiberal character?8 Can it be understood that the decline of  Islamic 
political parties mean that Muslims in Indonesia are becoming more 
liberal, more respectful of  human rights and pluralism? If  so, how do 
we explain the rise of  religious intolerance over the past ten years? How 
do we explain this paradox?
There is a research chasm needs to be filled to understand the 
link between political Islam and the Islamic political parties. To fill the 
gap, we must disentangle both variables. An accepted definition in the 
scholarly literature refers to political Islam as a body of  faith that believes 
that politics, society and the public sphere should be ordered according 
to Islamic religious ideals and principle.9 Islamic political parties are one 
aspect of  a strategy and effort to achieve an ideal society according to the 
Islamic principles. The concept of  political Islam presupposes idealistic 
philosophies, romantic, and abstract Islamic ideals. Meanwhile, Islamic 
political parties constitute a means of  bridging religious ideas and reality. 
In other words, Political Islam is an ‘idea’ while an Islamic political 
party is a ‘strategy’ to enable an idea to become reality. By explaining 
the differences between these concepts, be able to cut the Gordian knot 
created by the statement that political Islam’s decline corresponds with 
the decline of  Islamic political parties.  
However, we need to emphasize that achieving an ideal society 
according to Islamist interpretations, requires not only through 
participating in formal politics, but also the use of  a bottom-up strategic 
model by focusing primarily at the societal level. Indonesian Islamists 
believe that their vision of  an ideal society and politics could materialize 
effectively by with the society as a focal point. For example, Irfianda 
Abidin Datuk Penghulu, the Chairman of  Islamic Law Enforcement 
7 Kikue Hamayotsu, “The End of  Political Islam?”.
8 See Graham E. Fuller, The Future of  Political Islam. 
9 Ibid, p. ix.
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Committee (Komite Penerapan Syariat Islam, KPSI) of  West Sumatra, 
stated: 
“Although shari’ah regulations have not been implemented thoroughly in 
West Sumatra, we can see the increasingly growing awareness to enforce 
Islamic laws and practices in the society level. Therefore, besides struggling 
for the implementation of  shari’ah regulations, we have to focus on the 
society as a focal point”.10
Therefore, instead of  participating in formal politics, some 
religious elites decided to establish Islamic movements. In other words, in 
manifestations of  political Islam are not only evident in Islamic political 
parties; but also in Islamic movements with society as a focal point. 
Islamic Mass Organizations (Organisasi Massa, Ormas) are considered to 
be one group of  key actors in such a movement. The Komite Penerapan 
Syariat Islam (KPSI), Gerakan Muslim Minangkabau (GMM), and Front 
Masyarakat Pembela Islam (FMPI) are the most active mass organizations 
in promoting shari’ah laws in West Sumatra. Beside the local Islamic mass 
organizations, the Java-based Islamic groups, such as, Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Islamic 
Defender Front (FPI),  also very active in promoting the formalization 
of  shari’ah laws. Since the end of  Suharto era, these organizations have 
established their local branches in West Sumatra. 
This article attempts to address the gap in the literature that fails 
to address why political Islam endures and continues to grow despite 
declining support for political parties by analysing the link between 
political Islam and Islamic political parties in the wider context. The paper 
argues that a decline of  support for Islamic parties does not necessarily 
mean that political Islam is on decline. Also, those who support political 
Islam agendas may not automatically join or support the Islamic parties 
since Islamist hardline groups, generally, do not support democratic 
elections. Therefore, the increase or decrease of  political Islam in 
Indonesia may not be a reflection of  Muslim’s people’s support for the 
Islamic political parties.
In answering the questions and explaining the aforementioned 
paradox, the discussion will focus on two levels; the provincial level 
10 Interview with Abidin Datuk Penghulu, the Chairman of  Islamic Law 
Enforcement Committee (KPSI) of  West Sumatra conducted on August 2012.  
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and the regional level. For the provincial level, we have chosen the West 
Sumatera province as a case study, considering West Sumatra is one of  
the most widely province issued the shari’ah laws in Indonesia. Meanwhile, 
for the regional level, we have chosen Tanah Datar and Padang Pariaman 
region. Historically, Tanah Datar was known as Luhak nan Tuo, the 
‘centre’ of  the Minangkabau11 ethnic group. Meanwhile, Padang Pariaman 
was known as a propagation basis of  Islam in Minangkabau. 
The findings in this article are primarily based on fieldwork 
conducted from 2011 to 2012. To obtain information related to this 
topic, we conducted in-depth interviews with cadres and party elites at 
the provincial and regional levels; whit number of  Islamic organizations; 
and with local leaders and scholars in the West Sumatera province. 
Previous study on political Islam in Indonesia, focused on the relationship 
between political Islam and electoral and constitutional changes, but is 
largely neglected in the studies of  the change of  Indonesian Muslim’s 
behaviour toward politics. Therefore, the scope of  this study focuses on 
Political Islam and Indonesian Muslim behaviour, especially Minangkabau 
people toward politics. 
B. Political Islam in West Sumatra Post Reformasi
The support for Islamic political parties over the past ten years has 
declined in Indonesia. In the 1999 election, Islamic parties obtained 33.73 
percent of  the vote to secure 163 seats in parliament (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, DPR). However, the vote diminished to 25.83 per cent in 2009; 
although there was a momentary increase to 35.12 per cent to secure 219 
legislative seats in 2004 due to the dramatic expansion of  Prosperous and 
Justice Parties (Partai keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) (see Table 1). 
Yet, the decline of  Islamic parties post reform era does not mean 
that Indonesian’s Muslims no longer support political Islam. Although 
the support for Islamic political parties has declined, a large number of  
local regulations (Peraturan Daerah, Perda) based on shari’ah law have 
11 ‘Minangkabau’ refers to an ethnic group in central Sumatra. The term can also 
refer to the territory occupied by this ethnic group. Therefore, the word ‘Minangkabau’ 
is often used interchangeably. Since joining the Republic of  Indonesia, Minangkabau 
territorial areas were centralised into a province under Indonesian rules called West 
Sumatra. Therefore, the majority of  West Sumatra’s population is dominated by the 
Minangkabau ethnic group.
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been implemented at the provincial and district level all over Indonesia. 
As many as 78 shari’ah laws had been issued in 52 regencies in the 
country;12 26 among them, implemented in West Sumatra province (See 
table 2 below).
Interestingly, the implementations of  shari’ah laws in West 
Sumatra were generally established by the secular parties. The Golkar, a 
secular party, often proposes the implementation of  shari’ah laws in the 
province. The argument made is  that such phenomenon illustrates that 
political parties no longer have a clear ideology and have turned into 
very pragmatic organizations in order to gain political power.13 Scholars 
like Anna Seleny have argued that pragmatism is typically associated 
with modern democracy.14 Pragmatism is a reaction against idealistic 
philosophies, romantic, and abstract, countering instead that the truth of  
12 “Syariah Bylaws: ‘Time Bomb’”, Jakarta Post, April, 20, 2012.  
13 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia”, pp. 669-90.
14 Anna Seleny, , “Tradition, Modernity and Democracy: the Many Promises of  
Islam”, Prospective on politics, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 2006, pp. 481-94. 
Table 1: 
Islamic Parties in the House of  Representatives (DPR), 1999-2009
Parties
1999 2004 2009
Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats
National Mandate 
Party (PAN)
7.12 34 6.44 53 6.01 43
Crescent Star Party 
(PBB)
1.94 13 2.62 11 1.8 0
National Awakening 
Party (PKB)
12.61 51 10.57 52 4.94 27
Prosperous Justice 
Party (PKS)
1.36 7 7.34 45 7.8 57
United Development 
Party (PPP)
10.7 58 8.15 58 5.3 39
Total 33.73 163 35.12 219 25.83 166
Source: Indonesia Memilih, the General Election Commission (KPU)
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Table 2: 
Perda shariah implemented in West-Sumatera since reform Era
Year Regulation
2001 Provincial level: Provincial regulation number 11/2001 on the Control 
of, and Action of, Social Illnesses.  
Tanah Datar Regent, Mayor Instruction letter Number 451.4/556/
Kesra-2001 on the Imposition of  the obligation to wear Islamic Outfit 
for civil servants. 
Solok Regent, Local regulation Number 10/2001 0n Quranic Literacy 
for Pupils, Students, Brides and Grooms-to-be. 
2002 Solok Regent, Local Regulation Number 6/2002 on the Islamic 
outfit. 
2003 Padang Regent, Local Regulation Number 6/2003 on the 
comprehensive Koran Literacy for Regular and Islamic Elementary 
School Students. 
Padang Regent, Local Regulation Number 3/2003 on the 
comprehensive Koran Literacy for Muslims.
Solok Regent, Local Regulation Number 13/2003 on the 
Management of  Profession Alms and Any Kind of  Charitable 
Contribution. 
Bukittinggi Regent, Local Regulation Number 20/2003 on the 
amendment of  the local regulation Number 09/2000 on the Control 
of, and Action of, Social Illnesses. 
Sawah Lunto Regent, Local Regulation Number 01/2003 0n Quranic 
Literacy for Pupils, Students, Brides and Grooms-to-be.
Sawah Lunto Regent, Local Regulation Number 02/2003 on the 
Islamic outfit. 
Pasaman Regent, Local Regulation Number 22/2003 on the 
obligation to wear the Islamic outfit for Students and Employees. 
Pasaman Regent, Local Regulation Number 21/2003 on the 
comprehensive Quranic Literacy. 
Pesisir Selatan Regent, Local Regulation Number 31/2003 on the 
Management of  Profession Alms and Any Kind of  Charitable 
Contribution. 
Lima Puluh Kota Regent, Local Regulation Number 6/2003 on 
Quranic Literacy for Pupils, Students, Brides and Grooms-to-be
2004 Padang Pariaman Regent, Local Regulation Number 02/2004 on the 
Prevention and Eradication and Suppression of  Social Illnesses. 
Padang Panjang Regent, Local Regulation Number 03/2004 on the 
Prevention and Eradication and Suppression of  Social Illnesses. 
Bukittinggi Regent, Local Regulation Number 29/2004 on the 
Management of  Profession Alms and Any Kind of  Charitable 
Contribution. 
Pesisir Selatan Regent, Local Regulation Number 08/2004 on 
Quranic Literacy for Pupils, Students, Brides and Grooms-to-be
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idea arises from observing its consequences.15 Along with the democratic 
process, political pragmatism is a common practice among political 
parties in Indonesia. This creates a paradox. The secular parties tend to 
push vigorously for the implementation of  shari’ah laws as evident in the 
West Sumatera province. Correspondingly the Islamic parties have asked 
for the implementation of  secular regulations, as seen in the province 
of  the Riau Islands. A legislative member from the National Awakening 
Party (PKB), a political party base on the Pancasila and drawing it 
constituency from Nahdatul Ulama (NU), proposed a bill that the city 
government to legalise prostitution in Batam Island and collect taxes 
from the commercial sex workers.16 
The requirement by the secular parties that shari’ah laws be 
implemented reflects the pragmatic attitude of  the political parties and 
their desire to build their political image among Muslims in Indonesia. 
Secular and nationalist parties, such as Golkar, have become more 
Islam-friendly and assertive in implementing shari’ah laws to gain more 
15 William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old ways of  Thinking (New 
York: New York Library of  America, 1986), pp. 112-113.
16 “Anggota DPRD Batam Usulkan Pajak 10% dari PSK”, Batam Pos, 15 
February 2010.
2005 Provincial level: Provincial Regulation number 07/2005 
comprehensive Quranic Literacy.
Provincial level: Governor circulation letter number 260/421/X/PPr-
05 on the obligation to wear the Islamic outfit for civil servants. 
Pesisir Selatan Regent, Local Regulation Number 04/2005 on Islamic 
outfit. 
Agam Regent, Local Regulation Number 06/2005 on the Islamic 
outfit.
Padang Regent, Mayor Instruction Number 451.422/Binsos-III/2005 
on 07 March 2005 on the obligation to wear a Headscarf  and the 
Islamic Outfit (for Muslims) and Suggestion (for Non-Muslims).   
Padang Regent, Mayor Instruction on 7 March 2005 on obligation to 
wear the Islamic outfit for Muslim Women
2006 Sawah Lunto Regent, Local Regulation Number 19 2006 on the 
Prevention and Eradication and Suppression of  Social Illnesses.
2008 Padang Panjang Regent, Local Regulation Number 07/2008 on 
the Management of  Profession Alms and Any Kind of  Charitable 
Contribution
Source: Law and Human Right Bureau of  West Sumatera Province, Daftar 
Inventarisasi‍Rancangan‍dan‍Produk‍Hukum‍Daerah‍Kabupatern/Kota‍Se-Sumatera‍
Barat‍2001-2008. 
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popular support from the majority of  Muslim voters.17 However, to 
understand the context, we need to comprehend not only the dynamic 
at the constitution and electoral levels but also the nature of  political 
and social change shaping Minangkabau society.
Indonesia’s Muslim voters in are becoming more religious, pious, 
and growing more conservative, however; such traits do not shape their 
voting behaviour.18 The West Sumatra province is not an exception to 
this trend. The only survival strategy for secular and nationalist parties 
is become more adaptive to the Islamic agendas combining pragmatism 
and piety rather than adopting moderate centralist ideologies. This trend 
exists because the political parties have to keep abreast with social change 
rather than adopt secularist now deemed idealistic. Therefore, we would 
contest the argument that “the adoption of  a moderate centralist ideology 
would be key for the political survival of  religious parties in emerging 
democracy”.19 Such a viewpoint is premature as the political landscape 
in a region like West Sumatra continues to by dynamic and evolving.  
The implementation of  shari’ah law by secular parties in the 
province of  West Sumatra is shaped by two trends, first, the pragmatism 
of  political parties, and second, consistency and idealism of  Minangkabau 
people who remain ‘devoted’ to their religious. Irrespective of  the role 
of  political parties in West Sumatra, the loyalty of  elected parliament 
members to the ‘Islamic teaching’ is far greater than their loyalty to the 
political parties that nominate them. For example, Buya Drs. H. Khaidir 
Bandaro Khatib, parliament member of  West Sumatra from National 
Mandate Party, a political party base on the Pancasila, stated: 
“The application of  shari’ah laws in West Sumatra is an obligation, as 
Minangkabau society upholds religious and Minangkabau traditional 
values. The commitment to religion and tradition is clearly stated in the 
guiding philosophy of  life of  Minangkabau people, adaik basandi sarak, 
sarak basandi kitabullah. West Sumatra province is left behind compared 
to Aceh and South Sulawesi, in implementing shari’ah. Therefore, the 
local government has to work extra hard to implement the shari’ah laws.”20
17 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia”, pp. 669-90.
18 Greg Fealy, “Indonesia’s Islamic Parties in Decline”.
19 Kikue Hamayotsu, “The End of  Political Islam?”
20 The Interview with Buya Drs. H. Khaidir Bandaro Khatib, parliament member 
of  West Sumatra from National Mandate Party was conducted in July 2012. 
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Therefore, when they become a member of  parliament, they 
tend to voice their support for the implementation of  shari’ah laws in 
spite of  their political parties background. Therefore, this trend can be 
summarised as a form of  political pragmatism that goes hand in hand 
with majority Minangkabau beliefs that is shaped by growing religiosity. 
This trend captures by a survey conducted in 2001 by Research Centre 
for the Study of  Islam and Society (Pusat Kajian Islam dan Masyarakat, 
PPIM) of  Syarif  Hidayatullah Islamic State University. The survey shows 
that religious identity is important to Indonesian when they asses their 
prospective quality of  their government and leaders. The survey shows 
that 57. 8 percent (in 2001) and 67 percent (in 2002) of  Indonesians 
are support the idea that Indonesia political system has to be base on 
Islamic teaching.21 
C. Minangkabau People: Social and Political Changes
Minangkabau people are well-known for being dynamic, open-
minded and their egalitarian character. They believe that all people are 
equal and that no such social stratification exists in the region. Although, 
historically they have been influenced by Indian culture, there is no ‘social 
class’ in Minangkabau. In addition, the Minangkabau people do not 
recognize the nobility which has a big influence at the supra-village level.22
When referring to the political history of  Minangkabau, there were 
two models of  traditional governance systems, i.e. bodi chaniago, democracy 
patterned, and koto piliang, aristocracy patterned. Both governance systems 
have similarities with the policies of  government in ancient Greece.23 
Datuk Katamanggungan established the Customary law of  koto piliang, 
while the customary law of  bodi chaniago was developed by Datuk Parpatih 
21 The PPIM Survey data in 2001 and 2002. The 2001 survey was conducted in 
sixteen provinces (all provinces in Java. North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, 
Lampung, Jambi, Riau, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and West 
Nusa Tenggara). The 2002 survey was conducted in all provinces except Papua and 
Maluku.
22 Tsuyoshi Kato, Adat Minangkabau dan Merantau dalam Presfektif  Sejarah (Jakarta: 
Balai Pustaka, 2005), p. 50.
23 Robert Johnson Bonner, Aspects of  Athenian Democracy (California: University 
of  California Press, 1933), pp. 25-86. 
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nan Sabatang.24
Symbolically, the difference between bodi chaniago and koto piliang 
is reflected in the construction of  the floor of  their rumah gadang25 
(traditional building) hall. The floor of  bodi chaniago hall is flat. According 
to their philosophy “duduk sama rendah, berdiri sama tinggi” (all people are 
equal). The floor of  koto piliang hall has a slightly elevated floor at the 
end which is where the penghulu pucuak (head of  penghulu) is seated. The 
philosophy of  koto piliang is “aie manitiek dari ateh”, (water dripping from 
above).26 Although the philosophy of  bodi chaniago and koto piliang is 
different, in practice both traditions were absorbed by the Minangkabau 
society simultaneously. 
In Minangkabau tradition, a leader has a slightly higher position 
though not significantly enough to create a distance from their people. 
Both in the tradition of  bodi chaniago and koto piliang, leaders cannot 
adopt a role similar to a king, sultan or emperor. This was reflected in 
the philosophy of  Minangkabau society over the leadership, namely, 
“didahulukan selangkah, ditinggikan seranting” (precedence a step, elevated a 
branch).27 Traditional leadership in Minangkabau is held by penghulu with 
the title datuak. A penghulu was elected among members of  his tribe and is 
required to guide and nurture his tribe. In carrying out his task, a penghulu 
aided by a young penghulu called penghulu panungkek could act on behalf  of  
the penghulu regarding, both the internal and external affairs of  his tribe.
The way Minangkabau people interpret leadership is very unique. 
Based on Minangkabau adat (custom) rules, a leader such as Mamak or 
penghulu cannot unilaterally determine a public decision. Every single 
policy in Minangkabau has to be based on consensus. The process of  
Musyawarah jo Mufakat has to be based on egalitarianism. Minangkabau 
24 Audrey Kahin, Dari Pemberontakan ke Integrasi: Sumatera Barat dan Politik Indonesia 
1926-1998 (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005)
25‍ Rumah‍ Gadang (Minangkabau: “big house”) is the traditional homes 
(bahasa: “rumah adat”) of  the Minangkabau ethnicity. The architecture, construction, 
internal and external decoration, and the functions of  the house reflect the culture 
and values of  the Minangkabau. A rumah gadang serves as a residence, a hall for family 
meetings, and for ceremonial activities.
26 Audrey Kahin, Dari Pemberontakan ke Integrasi.
27 Emeraldy Chatra, Adat Selingkar Desa (Padang: Faculty of  social and political 
science and centre of  development and social change studies, University of  Andalas, 
1999), p. 29.
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people are conditioned to debate and argue. Such characteristics are 
ingrained in the social dynamic of  Minangkabau people. Sandy describes 
Minangkabau people behaviour:
“Adat teaching is oriented to human morals and feelings. You do not 
accuse someone directly. You do not criticize directly. You do so with 
proverbs. It is very rude to point out mistakes directly. There should be 
no force in decision making. There should be mutual understanding. In 
Minangkabau democracy there is no room for rivalries. Differences of  
opinion are regarded as normal—consensus arrives through discussion. 
About differences of  opinion there is a proverb: Crossing wood in the 
hearth makes the fire glow”28
The traits shaping Minangkabau values, namely, its open-minded, 
egalitarian, consensus-base, and democratic culture has shaped the 
political thinking of  the modern Indonesian state’s establishment, 
particularly, since a large number of  Indonesian founding fathers and 
mothers are Minangkabau ethnicity. These elites participated in laying the 
conceptual foundations for a modern and democratic state for Indonesia. 
Names like Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, Mohammad Natsir, Tan 
Malaka, and Rasuna Said are well known as figures that struggled for 
the Indonesia’s Independence and were devoted to ideas of  democracy. 
Their thoughts and the ideas of  democracy that they fought for may be 
adopted from western political thought, but their Minangkabau culture 
also shaped much of  their premises. 
At the national level, War of  Independence and in the early 
1950s it was a ‘golden’ period for Minangkabau people. The debate 
about democracy and some other ideologies, such as, communism, 
was developed among Minangkabau intellectuals, both those who lived 
outside and in Minangkabau. Although Islam is the only religion of  the 
Minangkabau people, pluralist approaches were adopted my Minangkabau 
intellectuals when discussing about political ideology reflected in the 
thinking of  figures from West Sumatera and the ideological platform of  
parties that sprung up in the area. Politically, the Minangkabau were not 
only affiliated to Islamic parties, but also nationalist, secular, socialist, 
and communist parties.
28 Peggy Reeves Sanday, Women at the Center: Life in a Modern Matriarchy  (Boston: 
Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 20.
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Initially, the democratic and egalitarian character of  the 
Minangkabau people was, culturally, influenced by certain factors. The 
character building process of  Minangkabau people begins when they 
are teenagers when they live in surau (a communal house), where they 
learn to read the Qur’an and learn martial arts. This confirms that the 
influence of  traditional Islam in the formation of  democratic values was 
at the community level.
In Minangkabau, a teenage boy has to live with his peers in the 
surau. Living in the surau, accustoms boys to live within communal setting 
under the guidance of  village elders. As a result, a boy in Minangkabau 
gains more freedom compared to a boy from other kinship systems in 
Indonesia. In addition to building an egalitarian spirit, togetherness and 
mutual influence among peers, the condition created is also intended to 
provide greater confidence as a man. This culture has influenced men 
of  Minangkabau to have a democratic attitude. It is the accepted custom 
for individuals to discuss daily issues and debate with their peers at the 
social level, for example, with peers instead of  their parents. Thus they 
develop an egalitarian relationship with their mentors rather than with 
their father. A father is more likely to dominate the relationship, exerting 
his power over his son.29
As teenagers do not stay at home with their parents, ideas and 
initiatives flourish freely within the surau atmosphere where they can 
exchange their ideas and join in democratic debates. Therefore, the 
Minangkabau are also flexible in expressing their opinions.30 The practice 
living in the surau still continues practicing in West Sumatra province 
today, especially in the rural areas, but not in the urban areas, such as, 
Padang, Padang Panjang, Bukittinggi, Solok, and Payakumbuh. 
Base on Minangkabau philosophy, an egalitarian ethos was the 
norm where the position of  every person or every group was equal to the 
others. In other words, an individual cannot have a higher position than 
another. For this reason, excessive reverence to a government official, 
such as kissing their hand, is a highly reprehensible act in Minangkabau 
society. Kissing hands in Minangkabau culture only applies to children 
29 A.A. Navis, Yang Berjalan Sepanjang Jalan: Kumpulan Karangan Pilihan (Jakarta: 
Grasindo, 1999), p. 27.
30 Ibid.
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as a sign of  respect to their parents and pupils to their teachers.
An individual’s existence in Minangkabau is valued and respected 
within the limits of  togetherness. The saying “lamak dek awak, katuju dek 
urang” (good for us, good for others as well) is a reflection that a person 
was allowed to do anything to benefit themselves, as long as it does not 
harmed the interests of  others. Thus, a principle of  life was finding 
the balance between an individual’s life and social life. The egalitarian 
character of  Minangkabau society allows individual the opportunity 
to compete with each other for their dignity and wealth either as an 
individual or as a group.31
A second factor influencing the character of  Minangkabau 
people is the process of  merantau (to leave the homeland, experience 
life independently and learn from onother culture’s way of  life). The 
purpose of  merantau is reflected in the proverb “Ka rantau madang dahulu, 
babuah babungo balun, ka rantau bujang dahulu, di rumah paguno balun” (as a 
teenager, you are not yet useful at home. You have to go on merantau to 
have many experiences and become wise). 
Due to merantau culture, the Minangkabau customary rules are a 
accustomed to adaptation with progressive ideas. The tradition of  merantau 
has brought social and cultural changes to Minangkabau people’s values. 
Those who have returned from other areas in the region or even overseas 
often bring new ideas for the betterment of  their society. Therefore, the 
critique of  the Minangkabau tradition often comes from Minangkabau 
themselves.32 The ideas of  reform also include the reform relating to views 
about religion. Once a new idea to change their customary rules arises, 
conflicts invariably occur. The conflict occurs because of  a clash of  ideas 
between Minangkabau people returning from overseas with people who 
live in their village. However, usually conflict can be resolved through 
musyawarah jo mufakat (discussion to reach a consensus). 
Musyawarah jo mufakat was the hallmark of  Minangkabau people in 
resolving their problems. In the decision making process, Minangkabau 
people always conducted discussions based on the principle of  alue Jo 
patuik (rationality) by considering conditions, circumstances, time, and 
31 Ibid, pp. 56-60.
32 Mursal Esten, “Identiti Melayu Minangkabau di dalam Proses perubahan 
Budaya” in Sastri Yunizar Bakri (ed.), Menelusuri Jejak Melayu Minangkabau (Padang: 
Yayasan Citra Budaya, 2002), p. 78
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place. In other words, a decision that was made did not apply to all 
circumstances and times. Musyawarah jo mufakat is clearly a tradition that 
contains democratic values and has been carried out by Minangkabau 
people for centuries.33 Social changes in Minangkabau were considered 
normal. Therefore, the Minangkabau customary rules are a subject 
that can be changed. There was a proverb, sakali aie gadang, sakali tapian 
baranjak (after the river floods, the edge of  the bank changes), expressing 
an image of  Minangkabau’s openness to changes that occur in society.34
Not all change was positive. A result on the consequence of  merantau 
culture in the beginning of  19th century had disastrous consequences.  The 
conflict between those who have returned from Mecca and those who 
live in Minangkabau could not be resolved through musyawarah jo mufakat. 
In 1803, three pilgrims returned to Minangkabau; Haji Miskin, Haji 
Abdul Rahman and Haji Muhammad Arif. Following their return from 
Mecca, they insisted that the complete transformation of  Minangkabau 
society into an Islamic community could only be achieved through the 
use of  force.35
Haji Miskin’s puritan religious movement was supported by 
Tuanku36 Nan Renceh. Bukit Kaman, Tuanku Nan Renceh‘s village was 
used as the cradle of  their movement, where these two protagonists 
prepared their plan to impose a more puritan form of  Islam on the 
society. Gradually, Tuanku Nan Renceh was able to build a strong alliance 
with seven other leading ulama37 in Agam. Their ferocity earned members 
33 Mattulada, “Demokrasi dalam Tradisi Masyarakat Indonesia”, in M. Amin 
Rais, Demokrasi dan Proses Politik (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986), pp. 3-15.
34 Zainal Arifin, “Kompromi Dasar Kehidupan Orang Minangkabau: Sebuah 
Pemiki ran Awal” in Yerri S Putra (eds.), Minangkabau‍Dipersimpangan‍Generasi (Padang: 
Faculty of  literacy, Andalas University, 2007), pp. 165-166.
35 Ulrich E. Kratz and Andriyetti Amir, Surat Keterangan Syekh Jalaluddin (Kuala 
Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2002).
36 “Tuanku” was a title given to high-ranking ulama in Minangkabau who were 
recognized authorities in the Islamic sciences.
37 The term ‘ulama is most widely used to refer to the scholarly class of  Muslim 
societies, whose main occupation is the study of  the texts that make up the Islamic 
Tradition (religious sciences such as Qur’an, h} adi>th, tafsi>r (Quranic commentary), 
jurisprudence, and theology), but also the applied sciences such as medicine, biology, 
astronomy, and mathematics.
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the epithet ‘harimau nan salapan’38 or eight tigers.39 Tuanku Nan Renceh 
declared jihad (holy war) on those who refused to accept the Padri‘s form 
of  Islam and decreed to people of  his own village that an observance 
strict of  Puritanism must be followed. 
Historically, Islam had already entered Minangkabau society 
in the early sixteenth century.40 Though, its impact was marginal. A 
contemporary manuscript written in 1761, stated that most people in 
the inner highland were pagan or without religion with the exception 
of  notables who converted to Islam.41 Furthermore, W. Marsden who 
visited Minangkabau in 1799 observed that Minangkabau Muslims 
generally rarely performed Islamic obligations such as prayer and fasting. 
Attendances at mosques were also poor.42 
The Padri movement attempted to impose their strict interpretation 
of  Islam throughout Minangkabau society by by force. The outward 
manifestations of  the Padri village were the abandonment of  cock 
fighting, gambling and the use of  tobacco, opium, betel and alcohol. 
White clothes symbolizing purity were also to be worn, with women 
covering their faces and men sporting beards.43
During their conquests and control of  Minangkabau, the Padri’s 
inflicted various forms of  violence on people from all levels of  society 
including ulama and pious Muslims. In fact, the Padri’s even targeted the 
Syattariyah sufi order, which they suspected of  challenging their religious 
38 Harimau‍nan‍Salapan‍refers to Tuanku Nan Renceh, Tuanku Pasaman, Tuanku 
Rao, Tuanku Tambusai, Tuanku Lintau, Tuanku Mansiangan, Tuanku Pandai Sikek and 
Tuanku Barumun. 
39 Christine Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in changing peasant economy Central Sumatra, 
1787-1847, 2nd edition (London: Curzon Press 1987), p. 134.
40 Taufik Abdullah, “Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West 
Sumatra 1927-1933”, Monograph Series No 50, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 
Cornell University 1971, pp. 94-102; “Adat and Islam: An examination of  conflict in 
Minangkabau” in Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussain (eds.), Readings 
on Islam in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asia Studies, 1985). 
41 Christine Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, pp. 12-38.
42 Mohd Afandi Salleh and Hafiz Zakaria, “From Mekkah to Bukit Kamang: 
the Moderate versus Radical Reform in West Sumatra 1784-1819”, International Journal 
of ‍Humanities‍and‍Social‍Science, 1, 14, October 2011, p. 135.
43 Christine Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 132.
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authority in Minangkabau.44 Dobbin describes Padri‘s behaviour: 
To show their contempt for the order, they burnt down Paninjauan 
…one of  the earliest Syattariyah centres in the highlands, with a large 
population of  religious students…Next they turned their attention to the 
Empat Angkat area, and a war was waged against Koto Tuo (the main 
target was their own teacher, Tuanku Nan Tuo at Empat Angkat) and 
surrounding villages for six years…They looted and robbed the wealth 
of  the people …They killed the ulama and all the orang cerdik (pundits). 
They captured married women, wedded them to other men, and made 
their women captives their concubines. Still they called all their actions, 
actions to perfect religion.45
By 1815, the Padri managed to establish their rule throughout 
Minangkabau and some areas of  Tapanuli.46 They imposed a strict code of  
conduct on the Minangkabau society. A penalty system was implemented 
for the violation of  the Padri rules and each village dominated d by the 
Padri must appoint a qadi whose jurisdiction laid in religious matters as 
well as Islamic judiciary. Abd A‘la contends that the Padri committed 
structural, cultural and occasional violence in West Sumatra:47
The Padris committed cultural violence by justifying what they did by 
means of  religion, ideology, language and knowledge…They systematically 
designed structural violence by marginalizing their opponents among 
individuals and groups of  Minangkabau …This structural violence was 
then followed by occasional violence in the form of  physical attacks, 
abduction and even assassination.  
The Padri movement succeeded to imposing their values to the 
kelompok adat (indigenous groups) by establishing an agreement known 
as the Marapalam48 charter.49 The content of  the agreement is “adaik 
44 Mohd Afandi Salleh and Hafiz Zakaria, “From Mekkah to Bukit Kamang”, 
pp. 197-198.
45 Christine Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 135.
46 Mangaradja Onggang Parlindungan, Tuanku Rao, Terror Agama Islam Mazhab 
Hambali‍di‍Tanah‍Batak (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2007), p. 93.
47 Abdul A’la, “the Genealogy of  Muslim Radicalism in Indonesia: A Study of  
Roots and Characters of  the Padri Movement”, Journal of  Indonesia Islam, 2, 2, 2008, p 238.
48 Marapalam is the small area at the base of  Mount Sago, Lintau, in the Tanah 
Datar Region
49 Rikardo Simarmata, Pengakuan‍Hukum‍terhadap‍Masyarakat‍Adat‍di‍Indonesia 
(Ja karta: RIPP-UNDP, 2006), p. 160.
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basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah, syarak mangato, adaik mamakai 
(Minangkabau customary laws are based on the shari’ah and the shari’ah 
is based on Quran. Whatever the Quran says, Minangkabau customary 
laws will follow).50
By establishing the Marapalam Charter, the Padri movement 
succeed to change the structure of  political power in Minangkabau. 
Before the Marapalam Charter, the position of  penghulu as head of  their 
tribe is one among other key positions, namely manti51 and dubalang52. 
After the establishment of  Marapalam Charter, an additional leadership 
position was created, namely Imam. All of  the leadership position is 
called ‘urang ampek jinih’, (the four types of  people), penghulu, imam, manti 
and hulubalang.53 In customary Minangkabau practice, a penghulu role is 
differentiated from an imam, “kato penghulu kato panyalasai, kato imam 
kato hakikat” (the penghulu’s vocation is to resolve conflict; the imam’s 
vocation is to guide people explaining the fundamental rules which they 
must live in order to be ‘good’ Muslims). Prior to the Padri movement, 
penghulus had regulated various prohibitions and taboos relating to the 
adat action contrary to Islam. Under rules established by Padri, a penghulu 
must be a good practicing Muslim, a man, have indigenous linage, 
good character, knowledgeable, and capable.54 These new norms were 
contrary to indigenous tradition and weakened the penghulu’s position in 
Minangkabau society. 
Although the Padri movement was unsuccessful in acquiring 
support from the majority of  Muslims in Minangkabau, they succeed in 
introducing Islamic Puritanism to society. Therefore, it was not surprising 
that a ‘second wave’ of  puritan, Kaum Mudo, arose again in Minangkabau 
in the early twentieth century. This movement was pioneered by Syekh 
50 There is no certainty over the date when the Charter was declared at Mount 
Marapalam. It would be sometime before the hills of  Marapalam were controlled by 
the Dutch in 1832. For a debate on this issue, see Andi Asoka, Sumpah Satie Bukik 
Marapalam. Antara Mitos dan Realita (Faculty of  Humanity and the Local Government 
of  West Sumatera, 1991). See also Syafnir Abunain. Sumpah Satie di Bukit Marapalam, 
Perpaduan atara Adat dengan Syarak (Padang: Andalas University, 1991).
51 Manti is to convey the decisions have been made by penghulu in the meeting 
of  Nagari level.
52 The task of  Hulubalang is to implement the decision made by penghulu
53 Syafnir Abunain, Sumpah Satie di Bukit Marapalam, p. 115.
54 A.A., Navis, Yang Berjalan Sepanjang Jalan, p. 138.
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Muhammad Djamil Djambek, Syekh Ahmad Khatib, Syekh Taher 
Jalaluddin, Syekh Ibrahim Musa, Abdul Karim Amrullah, Abdul 
Ahmad, and Zainuddin Labai Al-Junusi. Although these two respective 
movements were influenced by the Wahabism purification movement in 
Mecca, the Kaum Mudo adopted a different typology in their strategy to 
achieve their vision of  an ideal society according to their interpretation 
on Islamic teaching. While, the Padri movement opted for a top-down 
strategic model by using armed struggle to achieve their goal, Kaum 
Mudo decided to use a bottom-up strategic model by becoming a social 
movement and focusing their movement at the society level. By using a 
soft approach, ‘Kaum Mudo’ succeeded to disseminate their ideas to purify 
Islam peacefully in West Sumatra. 
Instead of  using armed struggle to achieve their goal, the Kaum 
Mudo movement disseminated their ideas through sermons, muzakarah 
(religious discussions), and through publications, like books, whether 
in Arabic or Malay, articles, magazine, and newspapers, and through 
brochures. Among others, Al-Munir, published in 1911, and Al-Akhbar, 
published two years later, in 1913, were the key magazines used to 
disseminate their religious purification ideas. The Kaum Mudo movement 
also succeed in establishing schools, such as the Islamic School of  
Adabiyah in 1909, Madrassah Al-Diniyah in 1915, and Thawalib in 1919. 
The spread of  these new ideas led to the establishment of  modernist 
Muslim organisations, such as, Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad and Persis.55 
This movement succeeded in gaining support from Minangkabau people 
in the urban areas, such as Padang, Padang Panjang, Payokumbuh, Solok, 
and Bukittinggi.
D. Modern State and the Political Islam of  Minangkabau People 
By understanding the Islamic purification movement’s character 
in West Sumatra, it is not surprising why efforts of  Minangkabau people 
to implement shari’ah law as a part of  Indonesian constitution began 
in the early days of  independence in 1945. Minangkabau people were 
55 Azyumardi Azra, “Bali and Southeast Asian Islam: Debunking the Myths”, in 
Kumar Ramakhishna and See Seen Tan (eds.), After Bali: The Threat of  Terrorism Southeast 
Asia” (Singapore: Institute of  Defence and Strategic Studies Nanyang Technological 
University and World Scientific Publishing, 2003), pp. 31-50.
The Paradox between Political Islam and Islamic Political Parties
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2012 M/1434 H 349
greatly influenced by ‘Kaum Mudo’ the Islamic purification movement.56 
Therefore, the West Sumatra province was the bases of  political power 
for Islamic parties in Indonesia during the first country’s democratic 
election in 1955. Masjumi received 49% of  the vote, while the Tarbiyah 
Islamiyah Party (Perti) gained 28% while the Indonesia Communist 
Party (PKI) gained 7% and the Party of  Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) 
collected 3% of  the votes. While the Indonesian National Party (PNI) 
won the elections at the national level, they only received 1% of  their 
votes from West Sumatera.
Through the Masyumi party, Minangkabau people who were 
influenced by the Kaum Mudo movement had hoped to establish an 
Indonesian political and society, based on the ‘Islamic teachings’. 
However, lacking majority representation in the Constitutional Assembly 
(Majlis Kostituante) and its prolonged and unresolved debates over the 
state ideological basis, political Islam’s goal could not be materialised.57 
Moreover, Masyumi was banned by President Sukarno in 1960 due to the 
excessive involvement of  their cadres in the Revolutionary Government 
of  Indonesian Republic (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, 
PRRI) rebellion. The condition was exacerbated by the strong secularist 
character of  Guided Democracy (1958-1966) by President Sukarno.
The PRRI incident became a turning point in the history of  
Minangkabau people. During the war between PRRI and the central 
government, a significant amount of  infrastructure was destroyed with 
large numbers of  Minangkabau people killed. Under Guided Democracy’s 
political system, the power structure in West Sumatra was switched 
from the rule of  local leader to military control. Following the defeat of  
the PRRI, the military had complete authority to appoint local leaders. 
Although penghulu were still leaders their tribes, in essence, their powers 
was taken over by the army. As a result, the local leaders only implemented 
56 Islam is a powerful force in Minangkabau culture and politics particularly 
since the Kaum Muda ulama (Islamic modernist scholars) dominated Minangkabau social 
and political movements from 1927 to 1933. Their activities, primarily in the realm of  
religion and education, had a great impact on Minangkabau society as a whole. For 
further studies, see Taufik Abdullah, “Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement 
in West Sumatra 1927-1933”, Monograph Series No 50, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 
Cornell University 1971.
57 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia”, p. 670.
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the rules that were established by the government, following the Guided 
Democracy system. Moreover, the military which held a central position 
in the local government was pro-communist.58 They were not only anti 
PRRI, but also anti Masjumi and PSII. 
The centralised government under guided democracy had also 
undermined the ‘local democratic values’ of   the Minangkabau people. 
Under such situations, the inherent democratic character of  local 
communities could not be realised. There was no scope consultation 
‘spaces’ for discussion to reach consensus as was characteristic of  
Minangkabau society. The practice of  active debating that always occurred 
among the people gradually declined.  
The fall of  the Sukarno regime give the rise to optimism that the 
Minangkabau people could once again involved in local and national’s 
politics. However, this optimism proved still born when the New Order 
regime implemented a military backed centralised political system. The 
Minangkabau people may have been ‘saved from the tiger’s mouth 
but ended up in the crocodile’s.’ In 1973, the political party simplified. 
Four Islamic political parties were forced in to merger and become a 
single entity, namely, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan/PPP). Moreover, in the early 1980s, the Suharto regime 
succeeded to contain Islamism by requiring all Islamic political parties 
adopt the Pancasila as their asas tunggal or sole organising ideology. Now, 
all religious parties were required to get rid of  their religious platform 
and opt for secular Pancasila-base ideology.59
Under the New Order regime, all the local political elements 
were precisely regulated in a centralised manner with no regard to the 
heterogeneity of  local political systems which had existed long before 
the establishment of  the modern Indonesia state. In 1979, nagari60 which 
58 G. Moedjanto, Indonesia‍Abad‍Ke‍20:‍Dari‍Perang‍Kemerdekaan‍Pertama‍Sampai‍
PELITA III (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1988), p. 23.
59 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia”, p. 672.
60 Nagari is the lowest administrative level in Minangkabau. It is made up 
of  a territory, a political structure and its own legal system. To become a nagari, the 
community had to fulfil certain requirements: minimum of  four tribes already settled 
in the area; a meeting point where people can gather (balai adat); a mosque (masjid), 
arable areas; roads and an access to water (tapian tampaik mandi); see Tsuyoshi Kato, 
Adat Minangkabau dan Merantau, p. 2-3.
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had sovereign status, was autonomous, and had governed its people in 
a democratic manner was removed and replaced with the desa system 
(a top-down centralised political system), adopted from Java.61 This 
centralised system destroyed traditional institutions and culture at the 
local level that had existed for hundreds of  years.62
The centralised system not only changed the system and form of  
local government, but also influenced the Minangkabau people’s political 
behaviour. Minangkabau people become more and more politically 
pragmatic society. It can be seen from the results of  the elections under 
the New Order regime where the majority of  Minangkabau people voted 
for the Golkar. The number of  votes Golkar party gained during the New 
Order regime in West Sumatera almost always exceeded the average of  
the national share of  the votes for the party, dominating the number of  
seats in the Local House of  Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah, DPRD) (See Table 3).63
Table 3: 
Seats division in the local parliament (DPRD) as a result of  the 
election under the New Order in West Sumatera (1971-1997)
Party/Faction
Elections (years)
1971 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
Golkar 20 21 19 28 30 33
PPP 11 11 13 7 5 3
PDI 1 0 0 1 1 0
ABRI 8 8 8 9 9 9
Total 40 40 40 45 45 45
Under the New Order regime, public participation in campaigns and 
the elections seemed very high. This occurred due to mass mobilisations 
conducted by the Golkar party and the state apparatus that were not 
neutral. All of  the civilian officers campaigned for the Golkar party. 
The military, police, and bureaucracy were not impartial and influenced 
61 Gusti Asnan, “Penguasa Militer dan Pemerintahan Daerah: Sumatera 
Barat Akhir 1950-an dan awal 1960-an”, Analisis CSIS, No.4, 2003, p. 529.
62 Mestika Zed, Sumatera‍Barat‍ di‍ Panggung‍ Sejarah‍ 1945-1995 (Jakarta: Sinar 
Harapan, 1996), p. 294.
63 Ibid. See for results Syamsuddin Haris, Dinamika Politik DPRD Sumatera Barat, 
Ketika Kekecewaan Rakyat Menggumpal (Jakarta: LIPI, 2001).
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election results. With huge funds at their disposal and support from the 
bureaucracy and the security forces, the campaigns Golkar party campaign 
were always well attended. 
Political pragmatism was also the order of  the day especially with 
local leaders who ruled and were influential in West Sumatera. This 
phenomenon is reflected in the widespread act of  customary titles being 
given to national figures who were not of  Minangkabau decedent. These 
local leaders were raised under an authoritarian political culture that 
influences their political behaviour. These local elites were also likely 
to be pragmatic, and ‘conservative’ in the face of  progressive ideas that 
developed in the society. The rigid and hierarchical bureaucratic system 
had allowed ‘feudalism’ to thrive in West Sumatera. These local elites 
revolved around a political culture that was semi feudal, patrimonial 
and authoritarian. For instance, the Pemuda Pancasila, the biggest 
youth organisation in West Sumatera under New Order, evolved into 
an organisation dominated by thugs. This paramilitary organisation 
functioned as a political pressure group to intimidate the people to 
support the regime. They were also supported by the security officials.64
Under the New Order regime, principles of  egalitarianism 
considered the ‘hallmark’ of  Minangkabau culture could not be 
implemented. The Minangkabau people tended to obey every single 
order given by the autocratic regime in Jakarta. Practices of  consensus 
and consultation evident in previous eras were no longer practiced. There 
were no more debates among the people as seen in previous eras. 
Such pragmatic behaviour was also reflected in the existence, 
function, and role of  the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
The character of  these organisations was greatly influenced by the 
autocratic model imposed by the New Order.65 Under the regime, NGOs 
were generally the subordinate of  the state representative. As a result, 
the style of  leadership those leading such organisations were not just 
merely ‘feudalistic’, but also tended to be elitist. For instance, Lembaga 
64 Andrinof  A. Chaniago, “Rintangan-rintangan Demokratisasi di Indonesia”, in 
Maruto M.D. and Anwari M.K. (eds.), Reformasi politik  dan Kekuatan Masyarakat: Kendala 
dan Peluang Menju Demokrasi (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2002), p. 29
65 Taufik Abdullah, “Pengantar,” in Audrey Kahin, Dari Pemberontakan ke Integrasi: 
Sumatra‍Barat‍dan‍Politik‍Indonesia‍1926-1998 (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005), 
p. xvii.
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Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (LKAAM, the Foundation of  
Minangkabau Customary Laws), established at the beginning of  the New 
Order always supported the Golkar party. Although the the organization 
had idealistic aims, namely to preserve the local customs, traditions and 
culture of  the Minangkabau people, in practice, the LKAAM tended to 
be a political instrument of  the ruling regime to control the kelompok adat 
(indigenous groups). A number of  social groups also emerged under the 
New Order regime such as women’s, intellectual’s, civil servants’, youth 
and journalist’s organisations. For instance, the establishment of  the 
women’s organisation, Bundo Kanduang, did not merely focus on cultural 
issues, but also had a political aims, namely to bolster the legitimacy of  
the regime in power. The leadership group comprised members who 
were legislators from the Golkar party.
The pragmatic attitude also occurred among the Islamic 
organisations. Many Islamic scholars and Islamic activists supported the 
Government Party in elections. For instance Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah 
(PTI, Unity of  Tarbiyah Islamiyah), in the 1955 elections affiliated with 
the Islamic parties; however, when the New Order regime came to 
power, they were split into two entities. One faction affiliated with the 
Golkar party while the other one became the supporter of  an Islamic 
party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party). 
A similar situation also occurred in the Muhammadiyah, many cadres of  
this organization were the members of  the Golkar party. Moreover, a 
large number of  traditionalist Muslim charismatic leaders, whose words 
have traditionally been followed by Muslim villagers in West Sumatra, 
also support for Golkar party. 
E. Post Suharto West Sumatra
Although the Suharto’s authoritarian regime was replaced by 
a democratic system, the pragmatic attitude of  Minangkabau people 
toward politics had not changed. This was evident from the results of  the 
1999 election. The 1999 election results clearly illustrated the pragmatic 
character of  Minangkabau people toward electoral politics. Golkar party, 
the dominant party under Suharto regime, considered the party that 
destroyed traditional institutions and Minangkabau culture, ironically, 
won the legislative election in West Sumatra (see Table 4).
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Table 4:
the election result from the 1999 election in the province of  
West Sumatera (DPRD1)
Party/Factions Votes Seats
Golkar 464.729 12
PAN 423.315 11
PPP 402.359 10
PDI Perjuangan 213.749 5
PBB 115.928 3
Partai Keadilan 58.375 2
PII Masyumi 34.556 1
PKP 22.829 1
PUI 21.184 1
KAMI 20.868 1
PKB 17.553 1
Parti Persatuan 16.925 1
TNI/Polri - 6
Sources: 1999’s General Election in numbers, Direktorat Sosial Politik 
(Ditsospol) of  West Sumatera province
Instead of  implementing the reform agenda, namely, improvements 
of  bureaucracy and public services, the members of  the West Sumatera 
DPRD 1999-2004 were involved in a variety corruption scandal. Padang 
District Court found 43 members of  the West Sumatra provincial 
legislative council guilty of  corruption involving the 2002 provincial 
budget.66 Rampant corruption cases in West Sumatera damaged the image 
of  the regional parliament a pattern evident across Indonesia. The cases 
not only involved members of  the legislature at the provincial level, but 
also some members of  parliament and kotamadya at district levels, namely, 
Lima Puluh Kota, Padang, Padang Pariaman, Payakumbuh, Agam and 
Tanah Datar districts. 
Ironically, even though a string of  corruption cases implicating 
member of  the West Sumatera DPRD from 1999-2004 had been revealed, 
it did not influence the voting behaviour of  the local population in the 
66  “Mantan Ketua DPRD Sumbar Kembali diperiksa kasus korupsi APBD Rp 
6,4 milliar,” Tempo Interaktif, November, 3, 2004.
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2004 general election. The Golkar Party remained the winner gaining 16 
seats in the Legislative Assembly of  West Sumatera province. Ironically, 
the Golkar party gained an extra four seats compared to the 1999 
elections. (see table 5)
Tabel 5:
The 2004 West Sumatera election result for DPRD I.
Political Party Seats
PBB 5
PPP 7
Democrat Party 3
PAN 10
PKS 7
PBR 3
PDI P 4
Golkar Party 16
Sources: Regional General Election Commission (Election 
Commission) of  West Sumatera province in 2004.
Many observers concluded that the beginning of  the reformation 
era in Indonesia was the era of  the return of  ‘old’ politicians even though 
some of  them came  wrapped in ‘new clothes’, in both political and 
economic sense.67 The West Sumatra province was not an exceptional 
to this trend. ‘Old’ politicians who had accumulated vast amounts of  
money during the New Order regime had a better chance of  staying in 
power. Moreover, the ideas of  democracy, human rights and freedom 
of  speech were used only to protect their interests.68 The result of  the 
2004 elections illustrated that there were no fundamental changes in the 
political structure of  the West Sumatera province. The power to mobilize 
funds was the most decisive factor in the victory of  the Golkar party in 
the 2004 legislative elections aided by the ‘pragmatism’ of  the people in 
West Sumatera. 
Based on the experienced learned during 1999 election, West 
Sumatera commonly realised that the political system after the fall of  
67 Vedi R. Hadiz, “Menimbang Gagasan Transisi di Indonesia” in AE Priyono, 
Stanley Adi Prasetyo, Olle Tornquist (eds..), Gerakan‍Demokrasi‍di‍Indonesia‍Pasca-Soeharto‍
(Jakarta: Demos, 2003), pp. 58-59.
68 Andrinof  A. Chaniago, “Rintangan-rintangan Demokratisasi”, p. 29
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Indonesia’s New Order regime could not assure that their aspirations 
would be fulfilled. Based on interviews in Tanah Datar regions, the 
establishment of  political parties and elections were viewed by electorate 
as unproven from a material stand point and provide no guarantees that 
their political interests would be realised. For many of  them, the political 
representative is just a figment of  their inspiration. Datuak Panghulu 
Basa, head of  the Jambak tribe in Malalo, Tanah Datar stated:  
“Based on our experience from the 1999 to 2009 elections, once the 
election was over, the people returned to their work and politicians to 
their political intrigues. We neither met nor recognised each other again. 
How can we believe that the elected legislative will represent the real will 
of  the people? I don’t think so”.69
 For this reason, the local community quickly established a 
mechanism to force prospective legislative candidates to meet their 
demands before the elections were held. For instance, before the 
2004 election, the local community formed a committee to welcome 
prospective legislative members in some nagaris in the Tanah Datar region. 
They organised collective strategies to confront prospective legislative 
members in their social institutions. With the approval of  all citizens, the 
committee offered a service to facilitate a meeting between local people 
and the prospective legislative members. 
The committee then set a place and time for a prospective legislator 
to campaign. In the meeting, the committee set up a ‘ploy’ that tried to 
convince the prospective legislative member that the people agreed to give 
their support. At the end of  the meeting, residents asked for some funds 
or goods to be disbursed by prospective legislative members. Depending 
on the speed of  the disbursement of  funds or material possessions to 
citizens, the sooner the community agreed to provide the political support 
required to secure the election for a prospective legislator. Therefore, 
with the power to mobilise capital, the Golkar party secured their winning 
position in the 2004 election in West Sumatera. 
The deal between the people and the prospective legislative 
members was often artificial and just a trick by the local community who 
now felt totally protected when exercising their freedom to vote.  No one 
69 Interview with Datuk Panghulu Basa, Head of  Jambak Tribe in Malalo, Tanah 
Datar, was conducted on September 2011.  
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was able to exercise their right to vote independently. In many cases, the 
‘ploy’ set by the people was not just for a prospective legislative member 
only, but was applied to every member who came campaigning in their 
area. For prospective legislative members, the pragmatic attitudes of  voter 
behaviour were a difficult political risk that had to be factored into their 
political equation. Prospective legislative members were aware that the 
amount of  funds and material goods they provided to the people in many 
cases were not equal to the number of  votes they gained. The politicians 
were also aware that the commitment of  people to give their support 
could not be trusted. People could simply break their commitment at the 
last minute just as a politician could break their promises made during 
the campaign. 
In the 2004 election, this pattern was a regular occurrence in all of  
Indonesia’s provinces. Public demand for the advance provision of  funds 
in advance was a political strategy to meet their needs. The acceptance 
of  money politics should not be seen as a negative public attitude or 
opportunism. It was a primary strategy in providing the voter with some 
semblance of  control towards an elected legislative member. Seen in this 
light, money politics was fully rational aspect of  the electoral system 
which while unable to produce good quality political representation, 
nevertheless, and was able to extract state resources for the benefit of  
its constituents. 
In the 2009 election, the contours of  political power in West 
Sumatera were altered. The Democrat Party that had previously only won 
three seats, now received up to 14 seats. Golkar party having obtained 
16 seats in the previous election now dropped to nine seats (see table 
6 below). This change did not mean that there was a shift in political 
behaviour at the societal level. It was actually an indication that the voter 
behaviour remained the same as in previous elections. The success of  the 
Democrat party in West Sumatera also reflected the pragmatic political 
behaviour of  Minangkabau society willing to exercise flexibility primarily 
because the Democrat was the government party.
Considering the pragmatism of  Minangkabau people and election 
outcomes after the Soeharto era where secular parties always triumphed 
in legislative elections, we should not conclude that political Islam is not 
a threat to the democratic process in the province. By contrast to the 
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1955 election, post reformasi condition in West Sumatra province seemed 
to suggest that Islamic parties had no significant political base. However, 
this does not mean that political Islam in West Sumatra is in decline since 
the facts indicate otherwise. Although the support for Islamic political 
parties has declined, a large number of  local regulations (Perda) based 
on shari’ah law have been implemented at the provincial and district level. 
F. Political Islam in West Sumatra: Wayang vs Dalang
The implementation of  shari’ah laws promoted by secular parties in 
West Sumatera was not surprising since many Islamic organisations opted 
to spread their members in various political parties. Muhammadiyah, 
the biggest Islamic organisation in West Sumatra is the most active 
organisation encouraging their cadres to join in the political parties 
regardless of  their ideological backgrounds. The branches of  all of  the 
nationalist and secular political parties in West Sumatra were penetrated 
by the Muhammadiyah. Some Islamic traditionalist streams followed suit. 
Rahmat Tuanku Sulaiman, one of  the prominent figures among ulama 
Table 6:
Votes and Seats in the parliament at the Provincial level of  West 
Sumatera province based on the 2009 election
Political party Votes Seats
People Conscience Party (Hanura) 102,324 5
Great Movement Indonesia Party 
(Gerindra)
79,649 4
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 186,866 5
National Mandate Party (PAN) 221,399 6
Golkar Party 316,374 9
United Development Party (PPP) 139,760 4
Crescent Star Party (PBB) 80,398 3
Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle 
(PDIP)  
71,264 3
Reform Star Party (PBR) 58,447 2
Democrat Party 471,124 14
Sources: Regional General Election Commission (Election Commission) 
of  West Sumatera province in 2009.
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of  Syattariyah, sufi order, in Padang Pariaman stated: 
“We are not supposed to only join Islamic political parties; we have to 
spread our people to the secular parties as well. By joining Islamic parties, 
we can’t do very much. What we need to do are to islamise the secular 
parties. That is the reason why I joined the Golkar party”70
As well as the establishment of  shari’ah laws at the provincial 
and regional levels, the public sphere in West Sumatra is controlled by 
Islamists. According to a report by the Setara Institute, in West Sumatera 
province, the rate of  politicisation of  religion is particularly high. This 
province recorded the second highest number of  incidents of  violations 
to freedom of  religion in Indonesia.71 For instance, at the beginning of  
2012, a civil servant, Alexander Aan, posted a message on the Facebook 
page of  ‘Atheist Minang’, which he created.  The post so enraged residents 
in Aan’s hometown of  Pulau Punjung in West Sumatra that an angry mob 
of  dozens stormed his office and beat him up. To add insult to injury, 
police then arrested him and wanted to press blasphemy charges that 
could see him locked up for five years.72 
Incidents of  violations to freedom of  religion and belief  in West 
Sumatra, such as, Aan case and dissolution of  Ahmadiyah group in 
Padang, highlight that Minangkabau people who are well-known as 
a dynamic, open-minded and egalitarian in their attitude have been 
replaced by a conservative religious attitude. However, the changes in 
social behaviour of  Minangkabau people; growing religiosity, piety and 
even more conservative attitude, is occurring along with the decline of  
support for the Islamic political parties. To understand this paradox, we 
have to disentangle the role of  Islamic political parties and political Islam 
represented by Islamic movements at the political and societal level. 
Based on Indonesian history, from the colonial to the reformasi era, 
social and political changes were always pioneered by social movements 
instead of  political parties. The behavioural changes evident in Indonesian 
Muslims leading to hardline conservatism were influenced by the Islamic 
70 Interview with Rahmat Tuanku Sulaiman, committee member of  Golkar 
Party in the region of  Padang Pariman, was conducted on May 2012.  
71 Setara Institute,‍Report‍of ‍Freedom‍of ‍Religion/Believe‍in‍Indonesia‍2008,‍Siding‍
and acting intolerantly (Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2008).
72 “Activists Call for Acquittal of  Embattled Atheist Alexander”, Jakarta‍Globe, 
13 June 2012.
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movements. In short, the social movement is the ‘dalang’,73 invisible man 
who sits behind the screen and ‘narrates’ the story of  Indonesian politics 
and social change; while, political parties is merely ‘wayang’ presented to 
the public. 
By understanding the logic of  ’wayang’, it should be recognised 
that support for the Golkar party under the Suharto regime cannot 
be interpreted to mean that Muslims in West Sumatra have changed 
their political orientations, from religious to secular. In the ‘screen’ of  
Indonesian political ‘wayang’ performance this might be true; however, 
in the case of  rural areas in West Sumatra, it was the role of  the ulama, 
the charismatic Muslim leader, functioning as the ‘dalang’ that influences 
the electoral behaviour of  the people. When an ulama was committed 
to support certain party, people would follow. For example, once Syekh 
Ali Imran Hasan, Head of  Pondok Pesantren Nurul Yaqin, a prominent 
Syattariyah Islamic Boarding School in Padang Pariman district, was 
committed to support the Golkar party in 1997’s election, Syattariyah 
followers from various part of  West Sumatra followed suit. This trend 
has also occurred among Naqsabandiyah, sufi order followers. Once 
Buya Taharuddin, prominent Naqsabandiyah sufi order in Padang Laweh, 
Tanah Datar committed his support for Golkar in the 1997’s election, 
Naqsabandiyah followers adhered to his political decision.
Under the Suharto regime, the presence of  ulama had widespread 
influence throughout the villages in West Sumatra, and was a contributing 
factor influencing Muslim electoral behaviour. Therefore, it should be 
recognised that an increase in the number of  devout Muslims who did 
support Golkar in the rural areas could be attributed to the role of  the 
ulama and their decision. Despite being less significant in shaping Muslim 
electoral behaviour under Suharto regime, the ulama have generally played 
an important role in politics and society. 
We have to bear in mind that the relationship between the ulama 
and society has long been institutionalised through patron-client norms in 
West Sumatra. Therefore, the ulama’s power is strong enough to influence 
the people’s electoral behaviour. Under the Suharto regime, the ulama 
and the government party have power in relation to society. They use 
73 Dalang is the genius behind the entire of  wayang performance. He sits behind 
the screen and narrates the story. 
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powers to bargain and gain funds for their movement.  Unsurprisingly, 
the Golkar party always won elections.
The role of  the ulama in rural areas in West Sumatra has not 
altered despite the change of  political system. Although secular parties 
have dominated elections in the post Suharto era, it would be a mistake 
to assume that the influence of  ulama in West Sumatra was weakening, 
particularly their ability to influence voter behaviour. In an interview in 
Tanah Datar, one of  respondents stated: 
“I don’t really care about the political party’s ideology. A lot of  elected 
parliament member from Islamic parties are bad people as well. They 
were involved in the corruption. I am satisfied if  my choice of  a party is 
compatible with what is recommended by Buya Anwar”.74 
Throughout the post-Suharto era, the ulama’s perspectives toward 
politics had again never altered. Ulamas believe that politics is one of  the 
strategies, among many others, to establish a religious society. Therefore, 
the ulamas are not necessarily involved in formal politics. For the ulamas 
at the political level, Islam is a source of  political ideas. Critically, they 
focus primarily in society. Ulamas concentrate on creating a favourable 
situation for the benefit of  people, rather than imposing ‘Islamic politics’ 
in a political arena. For instance, Muhammad Rais Tuanku Labai Nan 
Basa, an ustadz (teacher) in Pesantren Nurul Yaqin, in the Padang Pariaman 
region stated that: 
“The implementation of  shari’ah laws is a political commodity. It does 
not consider the substance of  the shari’ah itself. The practice of  shari’ah 
should be based on sincerity. A Muslim cannot conduct worship just 
because the rules in accordance with Islamic law were created by the local 
government. There is no value for worship because they are not sincere.”75
Nevertheless, Syattariyah, as a social group, succeeded in assigning 
their members to the local parliament, for example, the deputy of  
West Sumatra local parliament (2009-2014), Leonardy Harmainy, is 
a Syattariyah follower. According to Buya Ismet Ismail, Chairman of  
Syattariyah headquarters in West Sumatra, Riau, Jambi and Bengkulu 
74 The interview was conducted in Batusangkar, West Sumatra in July 2011. The 
Buya Anwar is prominent Shattariyah ulama in Tanah Datar. 
75 The interview was conducted in Pondok Pesantren Nurul Yaqin, Ringan-
Ringan Pakandangan, West Sumatra in July 2011.
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province:
“Some of  Syattariyah members succeeded in becoming parliament 
members from various political parties in West Sumatra. They were 
nominated by PPP, PKB, Golkar, Hanura, PKPB and some other parties”76
The traditional Islamic groups, such as Syatariyah and 
Naqsabandiyah77 have spread their Islamic ideal vision over the society, 
emphasising the institutionalisation of  Islam into people’s daily lives or 
in other words, by using the bottom-up strategic model. This trend is 
very different compared to the Islamist groups in urban areas, such as, 
Padang, Padang Panjang, Solok, Bukittinggi, and Payokumbuh. They 
profess what scholars now understand to be Islamism, namely, “Islam 
should guide social, political and personal life”.
The urban areas in West Sumatra remain the epicentre of  a 
burgeoning public sphere in which informed members of  the public debate 
highly contested Islamic discourses regarding legitimate government, 
social justice, gender relations and public space. Nevertheless, based on 
our surveys in Padang city, political Islam is a palpable force manifested 
everywhere in the city, government, daily consumption, cultural and 
media productions, civil society groups, social movements and educational 
institutions.
The situation in West Sumatra is very similar to other Islamic cities 
in the world. Political Islam operates at multiple levels. It simultaneously 
envisions itself  as a force for the revival of  global Islamic unity, a 
movement to reform the territorially defined national state and creator 
of  moral economy in urban neighbourhoods.78 The movement is 
concentrated among educated youth, such as University students and 
includes civil servants. They succeed in building networks, not only at 
the national, but also the international level. 
The idea of  the establishment of  an Islamic state (dawla al-Isla>miyyah) 
76 The Interview was conducted in Surau Koto Tuo, Agam region, in July 2011.
77 Syatariyah and Naqsabandiyah are two major Sufi streams evolved in West 
Sumatra. 
78 Paul M. Lubeck and Bryana Britts, “Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public 
Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shift, and Social Movements”, in J. Eade and C. Mele 
(eds.), Urban Studies: Contemporary and Future Perspectives (California: Center for Global, 
International and Regional Studies, University of  California, Santa Cruz, Blackwells, 
2001).
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is one of  the most crucial agendas for these groups. However, along with 
the regional autonomy laws implemented in Indonesia, their efforts are 
much more focused on the provincial and regional levels. Such attempts 
to establish an Islamic society in West Sumatra are carried out through 
legal process, more precisely, through parliament. Having support from 
parliament members, these Islamic movements are able to achieve their 
agendas unhindered and effectively. Most of  the parliament members 
in West Sumatra province support these ideas regardless of  the political 
background of  their parties.
In achieving their agendas to establish an ideal Islamic ideal society, 
Islamist groups created a diverse network of  civil society groups providing 
goods and services, such as, charity, free education, and free treatment. 
Therefore, they get tremendous support from the society. Moreover, 
due to endemic corruption, severe economic dislocation and moral 
degradation in the urban areas in West Sumatra, Islamism have emerged 
in variety of  platform as the most powerful anti-systemic social force 
opposing corruption, economic disparity and all of  the social problems. 
G. Conclusion
In democratic countries, people’s advocacy of  their religious ideas 
can be realised through politics, since the democratic system allows 
political parties to function as a means by which people can articulate 
their interests, including religious interests. For that reason, some Islamic 
political parties have been established. Through Islamic parties, Muslims 
can articulate their religious ideas to regulate their lives. Thus, Islamic 
political parties, ideally, constitute a means of  bridging religious ideals and 
the reality experienced by Muslims. However, the role of  Islamic political 
parties of  bridging religious ideas and politics does not work properly. 
For instance, instead of  bridging Muslims interest, Islamic parties also 
involve high-profile corruption cases and scandals; for example, the 
involvement of  PKS elites in corruption cases. 
Having learned from the experience, people in West Sumatra have 
lost their ‘faith’ in the political parties and have returned to their roots 
into a “pragmatic society” when articulating their political preferences. 
They no longer see voting for Islamic political parties as a ‘requirement’ 
to fulfil the Islamic teachings. However, regarding the issues of  religion 
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in their personal and social life is very important for them. Therefore, 
the Islamic movements, like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and KPSI are 
developing effectively at the society level and having greater influence 
of  Islamic political parties. They believe that the shari’ah law has to be 
implemented by using bottom-up strategic model focusing on the social 
level. By using a bottom-up strategy, Islamist groups in West Sumatra 
succeed to control the public discourse involving virtually all social classes, 
genders and status groups. Therefore, slowly but surely, the public sphere 
and government in West Sumatra province will be controlled by Islamists. 
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